This paper discusses the proof theory, semantics and meta-theory of a class of adaptive logics, called hierarchic adaptive logics. Their specific characteristics are illustrated throughout the paper with the use of one exemplary logic HK x , an explicans for reasoning with prioritized belief bases. A generic proof theory for these systems is defined, together with a less complex proof theory for a subclass of them. Soundness and a restricted form of completeness are established with respect to a nonredundant semantics. It is shown that all hierarchic adaptive logics are reflexive, have the strong reassurance property and that a subclass of them is a fixed point for a broad class of premise sets. Finally, they are compared to a different yet related class of adaptive logics.
Introduction
Flat adaptive logics are a well-studied class of logics, developed to explain various non-monotonic reasoning methods.
1 I will give a brief characterization of these logics and provide an example of them in Section 2. A general format for these logics has been put forward, called the "Standard Format of Adaptive Logics" [3, 5] . If we define a logic in this format, the proof theory and semantics for this system, together with many important meta-theoretic properties are immediately available. * I am greatly indebted to Christian Straßer and Diderik Batens for their comments to previous drafts, and for the fruitful discussions that helped to settle some central issues in this paper.
1 I refer to [10, p.2] for a recent overview of the many different adaptive logics developed so far, and their applications to problems in philosophy and artificial intelligence. Unpublished papers in the reference section (and many others) are available from the internet address http://logica.UGent.be/centrum/writings/.
Flat Adaptive Logics

The Standard Format
In this section, the building blocks for the rest of the paper are presented: the flat adaptive logics defined in standard format. I will only explain the general characteristics, and refer to [3] for details and meta-theoretic proofs.
A flat adaptive logic AL x is defined by a triple:
1. A lower limit logic LLL: a reflexive, transitive, monotonic and compact logic that has a characteristic semantics and contains CL (Classical Logic) 2. A set of abnormalities Ω: a set of formulas , characterized by a (possibly restricted) logical forms F which contains at least one logical symbol; or a union of such sets 3. An adaptive strategy: Reliability or Minimal Abnormality
As is clear from 1., all viable candidates for an LLL are Tarski-logics and are assumed to be sound and complete with respect to their semantics. Anything that is LLL-derivable from Γ, is AL x -derivable from Γ. Where AL x captures a reasoning method for a certain context, LLL expresses the logical certainties within this context. The logic AL x strengthens its LLL by adding a (defeasible) assumption, i.e. that formulas that have the logical form of an abnormality are false.
The classical connectives of LLL are noted as¬,∨,∧,⊃,∃,∀. The language of LLL without the classical connectives is denoted by L; for most practical applications the premise set of the adaptive logic is stated in this language. The language of LLL with the classical connectives is denoted by L + and the set of closed formulas of L + by W + . The adaptive logic is a function: ℘(W + ) → ℘(W + ).
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The set of abnormalities Ω represents those formulas that the adaptive logic assumes to be false unless the premises run counter to this assumption. This vague phrase is turned into a precise criterion by the adaptive strategy (x), that can be either Reliability (r) or Minimal abnormality (m).
The categorization of an adaptive logic as "flat" refers to the fact that in a certain sense, all abnormalities in Ω are treated equally by this logic. This will be specified during the course of this paper, when the distinction is made between flat and hierarchic adaptive logics. In the literature, flat adaptive logics are often referred to as simple adaptive logics, or as adaptive logics in standard format.
Before we come to the AL x -semantics, we first need a few extra definitions. Where L is a logic with a characteristic semantics, we say that M is a L-model of Γ iff M is a L-model and it validates every member of Γ. M L Γ denotes the set of L-models of Γ. As defined below, the set of adaptive models of Γ is always a subset of the set of LLL-models of Γ.
Throughout this paper, all formulas in W + are assumed to be finite strings. A Dab-formula Dab(∆) is the classical disjunction of the members of ∆ ⊂ Ω, whence ∆ is a finite set. Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ LLL Dab(∆) and there is no ∆ ⊂ ∆ for which Γ LLL Dab(∆ ). Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences of Γ, let Σ(Γ) = {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . .}. Let U (Γ) = Σ(Γ). We say that U (Γ) is the set of unreliable formulas with respect to Γ. Finally, where M is a LLL-model, Ab(M ) is the set {B | B ∈ Ω, M |= B}.
Definition 1 A LLL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M ) ⊆ U (Γ).
Definition 2 Γ |= AL r A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
Definition 3 A LLL-model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no LLLmodel M of Γ such that Ab(M ) ⊂ Ab(M ).
Definition 4 Γ |= AL m A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models of Γ.
Although the above definition of Γ |= AL m A is more direct, we can also define the semantics of Minimal Abnormality in terms of the minimal Dabconsequences of Γ. This requires some notational preparation. Where Σ is a set of sets, we say that ϕ is a choice set of Σ iff for every ∆ ∈ Σ, ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅. ϕ is a minimal choice set of Σ iff there is no choice set ψ of Σ such that ψ ⊂ ϕ. The following is proven in [5, Chapter 5] :
Lemma 1 If Σ is a set of finite sets, then Σ has minimal choice sets.
Φ(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of Σ(Γ). Note that since all the members of Σ(Γ) are finite, Φ(Γ) = ∅ for every Γ ⊆ W by Lemma 1. It is proven in [3] that M is a minimally abnormal model iff Ab(M ) ∈ Φ(Γ) (see Theorem 8 below) .
The proof theory of adaptive logics reflects the dynamic character of nonmonotonic reasoning methods. Every AL x -proof consists of lines that have four elements: a line number i, a formula A, a justification (consisting of a series of line numbers and a derivation rule) and a finite condition ∆ ⊆ Ω. Where Γ is the set of premises, the inference rules are given by
. . . . . .
A stage of a proof can be seen as a sequence of lines, obtained by the application of the above rules. A proof is simply a chain of stages. Every proof starts off with stage 1. Adding a line to a proof by applying one of the rules of inference brings the proof to its next stage, which is the sequence of all lines written so far. In view of the inference rules, the condition and the justification of any line l are necessarily finite. Dab(∆) is a Dab-formula at stage s of a proof, iff it is the second element of a line of the proof with an empty condition. Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s iff there is no other Dab-formula Dab(∆ ) at stage s for which ∆ ⊂ ∆. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s of a proof, let Σ s (Γ) = ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 ∪ . . .. U s (Γ) = Σ s (Γ) and Φ s (Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of Σ s (Γ).
Definition 5 AL
r -Marking: a line l is marked at stage s iff, where ∆ is its condition, ∆ ∩ U s (Γ) = ∅.
Definition 6 AL
m -Marking: a line l with formula A is marked at stage s iff, where its condition is ∆: (i) there is no ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ) such that ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅, or (ii) for a ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is no line on which A is derived on a condition Θ for which Θ ∩ ϕ = ∅.
If a line that has as its second element A is marked at stage s, this indicates that according to our best insights at this stage, A cannot be considered derivable. If the line is unmarked at stage s, we say that A is derivable at stage s of the proof. As a line may be marked at stage s, unmarked at a later stage s and marked again at a still later stage, we also define a stable notion of derivability.
Where p is a proof, an extension of this proof is every longer proof p that contains the lines occurring in p in the same order. Hence putting lines in front of a proof, inserting them somewhere in the proof, or simply adding them at the end of the proof may all result in an extension of the proof. Of course, it is required that the justification of every line only refers to preceding lines in the proof.
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Definition 7 A is finally derived from Γ on line l of a stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line l, (ii) line l is unmarked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the stage in which line l is marked may be further extended in such a way that line l is unmarked again.
Note that in order to be finally derivable, A must be derived on a line l, where l ∈ N. This means that for every formula that is finally derivable from Γ, it can be finally derived in a finite proof from Γ. The following theorems are important for the rest of this paper and were proven in [3] -I give the original lemmata, theorems and corollaries between square brackets:
6 For more details on the notion of a dynamic proof, see [5, Chapter 5] .
An Example
Let me clarify the proof theory of adaptive logics by a simple example. The lower limit logic I will use is Kripke's minimal modal logic K on the basis of the standard modal language L M , axiomatized by the propositional fragment of CL together with the following axioms:
As usually, define ♦A = ¬ ¬A. Let W M denote the set of closed formulas in L M , and W a the set of atoms (sentential letters and their negations). K-models are defined as pointed-Kripke frames with the standard valuations.
The adaptive logic K r 1 is defined by the following triple:
the Reliability Strategy
Recall that in Section 2, Dab-formulas where defined as classical disjunctions of the members of Ω. Hence a Dab-formula can only be written down with the aid of the checked symbol∨. This has both meta-theoretic and philosophical reasons -see [5, Chapter 4] for more details. However, for reasons of space, and since the disjunction of K behaves classically, I now introduce the convention that in all subsequent examples, Dab-formulas are simply disjunctions of abnormalities. K r 1 is intended to explicate reasoning from plausible knowledge. It is but a variation on an existing approach to the handling of belief revision, within the adaptive logics programme.
7 That a formula A is plausible, is expressed by ♦A. We thus translate the original set of plausible statements Γ into Γ ♦ = {♦A | A ∈ Γ}. We may also reason from certainties together with plausible knowledge, such that a premise set contains formulas of the form ♦A and A, where A is a non-modal formula. The adaptive logic enables one to derive A from ♦A, in case that ♦A ∧ ¬A does not occur in a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ. This makes sense in view of the fact that our plausible knowledge can be contradicted by other plausible knowledge, or by certainties.
Consider the following premise set: Γ = {♦p, ♦q, ♦r, ¬p ∨ ¬q}. We start a K r 1 -proof from Γ by writing down the premises:
Note that the fourth element is ∅, indicating that premises are derived on the empty condition. We may now derive p from line 1, using RU and RC:
A similar logic based on Feys' modal logic T is presented in [9] .
For the time being, ignore the 7 at line 6. At stage 6 of the proof, there are no unreliable formulas: U 6 (Γ) = ∅, and p is derived on an unmarked line. However, we may immediately add the following line:
This means that U 7 (Γ) = {♦p ∧ ¬p, ♦q ∧ ¬q}. As a consequence line 6 is marked at stage 7 of the proof, which is indicated by the 7 . Moreover, since Γ K ♦q ∧ ¬q, the line will be marked in every extension of the proof. On the other hand we can apply RC to derive r on an unmarked line:
Line 10 is unmarked in every extension of the proof, since the only minimal Dab-consequence from Γ is the formula on line 7, hence no new Dab-formula can render ♦r ∧ ¬r unreliable.
The difference between Reliability and Minimal Abnormality can also be clarified by the above example. Minimal Abnormality is a little stronger:
The K-models of Γ that verify ♦p ∧ ¬p and ♦q ∧ ¬q are not minimally abnormal, since there are models that verify only one of both abnormalities.
This implies that there must be a K m 1 -proof in which p ∨ q is finally derived. Since the choice of the strategy only affects the marking definition in the proof theory, we may simply continue the preceding proof to achieve this goal:
Note that throughout the stages 11-14, Φ s (Γ) remains the same, that is, Φ s (Γ) = Φ(Γ) = {{♦p ∧ ¬p}, {♦q ∧ ¬q}}. Let us call the choice sets ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 respectively. From stage 11 to stage 13, line 11 is marked. That is, as long as p ∨ q is not derived on a line with condition ∆ such that ∆ ∩ ϕ 1 = ∅, the marking definition stipulates that line 11 is marked. However, at stage 14, line 11 is unmarked, because at that stage of the proof we know that p ∨ q is true both when ♦p ∧ ¬p is false, and when ♦q ∧ ¬q is false. Line 13 will however be marked in every extension of the proof, hence q is treated in exactly the same way as p.
Hierarchic Adaptive Logics
A Precise Definition
I will now consider combinations of two or more flat adaptive logics, denoted by AL 1 , AL 2 , . . .. Unless stated differently, the results in this paper hold for combinations of both finitely and infinitely many flat adaptive logics. Henceforth, I use the index set I ⊆ N to range over the set of flat adaptive logics that are used in the combined adaptive logic.
I will narrow down the focus to combinations of logics that have the same lower limit logic LLL and the same strategy. Although the union of the consequence sets of adaptive logics with a different lower limit logic or strategy may have interesting applications, this case is much harder to deal with from a universal, meta-theoretic point of view. In the remainder, Ω 1 , Ω 2 , . . . refer to the respective sets of abnormalities of the flat logics AL Let us return to the basic idea from the introduction: the combination of flat adaptive logics through a union of their respective consequence sets. A first problem this combination faces is that the consequence set is not always closed under LLL. Let me briefly explain this. For a logic L to be closed under another logic L , the following must hold:
As explained in Section 2.1, LLL delivers the unconditional rules for every logic AL x i . This means that these rules are also unconditionally valid in CAL. It would therefore be strange that the application of these rules to Cn CAL (Γ) would result in a yet different consequence set.
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There is also a more technical reason why CAL should be LLL-closed. Note that if ( †) does not hold for LLL, then the CAL-models of Γ (if any) are not LLL-models of Γ (on the assumption that every CAL-model of Γ validates every member of Cn CAL (Γ)). Hence if we want to characterize the combined adaptive logic by a semantics that is somehow similar in spirit to the AL-semantics, it has to be closed under LLL.
However, as defined in Section 1, Cn CAL is not closed under LLL. It is rather easy to produce an example for which ( †) fails -Section 5 contains one. An obvious way out is to redefine the combination, and thus obtain CAL :
For CAL , obviously ( †) holds with L = LLL, since LLL is a Tarski-logic.
This relates to a second problem: can we assure that Cn CAL (Γ) is not LLL-trivial, unless Γ is itself LLL-trivial? The answer to this question depends on the specific sets of abnormalities that are involved in the definition. If for i, j ∈ I, neither Ω i ⊆ Ω j , nor Ω j ⊆ Ω i , the answer is negative.
To see why, suppose A ∈ Ω i − Ω j and B ∈ Ω j − Ω i , Γ = {A∨ B}. Suppose moreover that A and B are both LLL-contingent, hence Γ is not LLL-trivial. But according to the definition of a Dab-consequence in Section 2, A∨ B is not a Dab-consequence of Γ for either of the two logics AL 
To further simplify the meta-theory and notation, it will be assumed that the following stronger requirement holds:
The resulting logic is different from a flat adaptive logic with Ω = i∈I . The combination imposes a hierarchy on the total set of abnormalities, and most often yields a larger consequence set than its flat counterpart -see Section 8 for more details. This combination is called a hierarchic adaptive logic, and henceforth referred to as HAL x . Let us now look at the full-blown definition of Cn HAL x (Γ). It is stipulated that Ω i i∈I is a sequence of sets of formulas given by a (possibly restricted) logical form, and that for all i ∈ I, Ω i ⊂ Ω i+1 . Where i ∈ I and x ∈ {Reliability, Minimal Abnormality}, AL x i is defined by (i) LLL, (ii) Ω i and (iii) the Strategy x. Define HAL x as follows:
The proof theory and semantics that yield this consequence set will be defined in the next two sections. Soundness and completeness will be discussed with reference to membership of the consequence set. Note that, as for flat adaptive logics, we may define a hierarchic adaptive logic by a triple, where the second element is a sequence of sets of abnormalities: LLL, Ω i i∈I , x , where x ∈ {r, m}.
An Example: HK r
In Section 2.2, we saw an example of the flat logic K
x that helps us cope with (possibly inconsistent or false) plausible knowledge. However, in real life, we often distinguish between different degrees of plausibility. A lengthy discussion of the issue can be found in [11] , and adaptive logics for the consequence relations from that paper were presented in [19] . A hierarchic variant of K x results in a similar consequence relation.
To express the plausibility degree of a piece of information, sequences of diamonds are used: ♦♦ . . . ♦A. The longer the sequence, the less plausible the information. A sequence of i diamonds will be abbreviated by ♦ i . If we start from a prioritized belief base Ψ = {Γ 0 , Γ 1 , Γ 2 , . . .}, where the subscript of each Γ indicates its priority degree and Γ 1 is the set of the most plausible beliefs, let
The HK x -consequence set of Γ is given by the following recursive definition:
Note that by the definition above, Ω 1 ⊂ Ω 2 ⊂ . . .. More generally, HK x is defined in the format of Definition 9, hence it is a hierarchic adaptive logic. Some results can give a first hint at how this logic works. Consider the set Γ = {♦p, ♦♦q, ♦♦r, ¬p ∨ ¬r}. The following is provable for both x = r and x = m:
These results will be commented upon in the Section 5. Note that in all subsequent sections, HK x refers to a particular logic, whereas HAL x is used as a variable for any logic that is constructed according to Definition 9.
Some Important Lemmas
Several proofs in subsequent sections rely on one crucial lemma and a number of other lemmas that can be easily derived from it. To facilitate the reading of the paper, their proofs will be presented in this separate section. Readers who are only interested in the main results of the paper may skip them. To prepare for the crucial lemma, one lemma about minimal choice sets need to be established first:
. .} is a set of sets and (2) ϕ is a choice set of Σ: (3) for every A ∈ ϕ, there is a ∆ i ∈ Σ for which ∆ i ∩ ϕ = {A} iff (4) ϕ is a minimal choice set of Σ.
Proof. Suppose (1) and (2) hold. (⇒) Suppose (3) holds, and consider a ϕ ⊂ ϕ and a B ∈ ϕ, B ∈ ϕ . By (3), there is a ∆ i ∈ Σ for which ∆ i ∩ ϕ = {B} and hence ∆ i ∩ ϕ = ∅. This implies that ϕ is not a choice set of Σ. As a result, ϕ is a minimal choice set of Σ. (⇐) Suppose there is a B ∈ ϕ such that, for no ∆ i ∈ Σ, ϕ ∩ ∆ i = {B}. In that case for every ∆ i for which B ∈ ∆ i , there is a C ∈ ϕ such that C ∈ ∆ i . Hence ϕ − {B} is a choice set of Σ, hence ϕ is not a minimal choice set of Σ.
Let me introduce some notational conventions to facilitate the proofs. Where
. .} and define Φ i (Γ) as the set of minimal choice sets of Σ i (Γ). Furthermore, for every i ∈ I, i > 1, we define Ω i = Ω i − Ω i−1 and we stipulate that Ω 1 = Ω 1 .
Note that for each
By the right-left direction of Lemma 2 and the fact that ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), for every A ∈ ϕ there is a ∆ ∈ Σ i (Γ) such that ∆ ∩ ϕ = {A}. Moreover, for all these ∆,
, which gives us:
From the right-left direction of Lemma 2: for every A ∈ ϕ , there is a Θ such that Θ ∩ ϕ = {A}, where
By (1) and (2):
Lemma 4 For all i ∈ I and for every ϕ
The lemma follows immediately in view of Lemma 3.
Throughout the rest of this paper, I will refer to the flat adaptive logic AL x that is defined by (i) LLL, (ii) Ω = i∈I Ω i , (iii) the strategy x ∈ {r, m}. The notions of a minimal Dab-consequence, Ab(M ), U (Γ) and Φ(Γ) are defined as in Section 2.
It is important to observe that Lemma 4 holds no matter how we define the hierarchic adaptive logic. More specifically, it does not depend on the way the Ω i s are constructed, as long as requirement ( ‡ ) from Section 3 holds. Moreover, this requirement implies that Ω i ⊂ Ω for every i ∈ I, and that Ω i ⊂ Ω j for every i, j ∈ I such that i < j. Hence we can derive:
Lemma 5 For all i ∈ I and for every ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), there is a ψ ∈ Φ(Γ) for which ψ ∩ Ω i = ϕ.
Lemma 6 For all i, j ∈ I, j > i and for every ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), there is a ψ ∈ Φ j (Γ) for which ψ ∩ Ω i = ϕ.
A last lemma concerns the cardinality of Φ i (Γ) in view of Φ(Γ):
Lemma 7 For every i ∈ I, the cardinality of Φ i (Γ) is never bigger than that of Φ(Γ).
Proof. Let i ∈ I and consider a ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ i (Γ), with ϕ = ψ. By Lemma 5, there is a ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ) : ϕ ∩ Ω i = ϕ and a ψ ∈ Φ(Γ) : ψ ∩ Ω i = ψ. As a result, ϕ = ψ .
The Proof Theory
Can we establish a unified proof theory for Cn HAL x (Γ), notwithstanding the fact that it is the result of the application of several adaptive logics to Γ, that each have their own separate proof theory? As the header of this section indicates, we can. This will be possible through an extension of the existing proof theory for flat adaptive logics. In Section 5.1, this generic proof theory for both the Reliability and the Minimal Abnormality Strategy is spelled out; in Section 5.2, the adequacy of this proof theory with respect to Definition 9 is proven. After this general approach, a shorter and intuitively appealing proof theory for HAL r is discussed in Section 5.3.
Starred Marking
The proof theory of HAL x contains the inference rules PREM, RU and RC of AL x . One extra inference rule RU* will be introduced to complete the proof theory for HAL
x . For reasons that will become clear in this section, the application of RU and RC are restricted to a subclass of preceding lines in the proof, such that the following holds:
Restriction 1: RU and RC are only applied to lines with a condition ∆ ⊂ Ω.
Let us first assume that these are the only inference rules for a HAL-proof from Γ. Consider the Γ from Section 3.2, and consider a HK r -proof from Γ:
On line 6, we have derived p on the condition ♦p ∧ ¬p. However, this condition occurs in a minimal Dab-formula on line 7. So we may ask ourselves: should line 6 be marked?
Recall the definition of K r 1 . The set of abnormalities for this logic is Ω 1 = {♦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ W a }. This indicates that the formula on line 7 is not a Dabformula for the logic K r 1 . More generally, we can prove that ♦p ∧ ¬p does not occur in any Dab-consequence Dab(∆) of Γ, with ∆ ⊂ Ω 1 .
11 Hence Γ K r 1 p, and therefore also Γ HK r p.
The marking definition requires a classification of sets of unreliable formulas in view of the respective flat adaptive logics AL 
According to this marking definition, line 6 is not marked at stage 7, nor is it marked in any extension of the proof. In a similar spirit, we adjust the marking definition for minimal abnormality:
Definition 11 HAL
m -Marking: a line l with formula A is marked at stage s iff, where its condition is ∆, ∆ ⊂ Ω i and
, there is no line on which A is derived on a condition Θ ⊂ Ω i for which Θ ∩ ϕ = ∅.
With this new marking definition, Γ AL x i
A for an i ∈ I iff A is finally derived on a line l of a HAL x -proof from Γ, and the condition of line l is a subset of Ω. This is stated by Corollary 1 below. However, we are not home yet. Consider the following continuation of the proof from Γ:
Consider line 10. Note that the condition on this line is not a subset of Ω 1 , though it is a subset of Ω 2 . Hence this line should be marked in view of U 2 (Γ), and the formula p ∧ q is not finally derivable. However, both p and q are finally derivable in the proof. This is the example I promised in Section 3: it shows that Cn K r
r was defined in such a way that this problem is avoided. On the proof theoretic level, we therefore need to add one extra inference rule, and a new marking definition for lines that are inferred by this rule:
Definition 12 RU*-Marking: starting from l = 1: a line l is marked at stage s iff, where "i 1 , . . . , i n ; RU * " is its justification, line i 1 or . . . or line i n is marked at stage s.
The restriction to the application of RU and RC avoids that the condition * is intermixed with conditions of the form ∆ ⊂ Ω. Although this would not hinder the marking definition, it would severely complicate the proofs and the meta-theory.
Note that whether a line l is RU*-marked depends on whether the lines from which line l was derived are themselves marked. Those lines can be either HAL x -marked or RU*-marked. The general idea is that if the lines i 1 , . . . , i n are derived on an unmarked line, every LLL-consequence of A 1 , . . . , A n can be derived on an unmarked line in an extension of the proof, by applications of RU*.
The interpretation of a marked (unmarked) line at stage s remains identical, whether it is marked in view of Definition 10, 11 or 12: the second element of an unmarked line is considered as derived at that stage, the second element of a marked line is considered as not derived at that stage. To illustrate the new inference rule and marking definition, let me continue the proof:
11 p ∧ q 6,9; RU* * 12 r 3; RC {♦♦r ∧ ¬r}
12−13
13 p ∧ r 6,12; RU* *
13
Final derivability is defined in exactly the same manner as for flat adaptive logics (see Definition 7 and Definition 8, AL
x is replaced by HAL x ). This completes the proof theory of HAL x .
The Adequacy of Final HAL x -Derivability
The proofs of the various lemmas and theorems that lead to Theorem 11 below were obtained by slight variations on proofs for the Soundness and Completeness of AL x in [3] .
Lemma 8 There is a HAL x -proof from Γ that contains a line at which A is derived on a condition ∆ ⊂ Ω iff Γ LLL A∨ Dab(∆). x -proof in which A is derived on the condition ∆ by applications of PREM, RU and RC. It immediately follows that this is a HAL x -proof from Γ as well.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose
Lemma 9 If A is finally derived on line l of a HAL r -proof from Γ, where 
In every extension of the proof in which line l is marked, a Dab j -formula Dab(Θ) is derived on the condition ∅, such that Θ ∩ ∆ = ∅. As ∆ ∩ U j (Γ) = ∅, there is a Θ ⊂ (Θ − ∆) for which Γ LLL Dab(Θ ) -in other words, Dab(Θ) is not a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ. . Hence we can further extend this extension such that Dab(Θ ) is derived on the empty condition, and as a result line l is unmarked again. By Definition 7, A is finally derived on line l. Proof. (⇒) Suppose the antecedent holds. Since ∆ is finite, there is an i ∈ I: ∆ ⊂ Ω i , ∆ ⊂ Ω i−1 . By Definitions 7 and 8, line l is unmarked, and every extension of the proof in which line l is marked may be further extended in such a way that line l is unmarked. Suppose we extend the proof to a stage s by deriving every minimal Dab i -consequence of Γ on the condition ∅, whence Φ i s (Γ) = Φ i (Γ). 13 In view of Definition 11, line l is unmarked iff the extended proof has a further extension such that (i) ∆ ∩ ϕ = ∅ for a ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ) and (ii) for every ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), there is a line that has A as its formula and a Θ ⊂ Ω i as its condition such that Θ ∩ ϕ = ∅. (ii) holds iff for every ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), there is a Θ ⊂ Ω i such that ϕ ∩ Θ = ∅ and Γ LLL A∨ Dab(Θ). By Theorem 7,
A for an i ∈ I. By Theorem 7: ( †) for every ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ), there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω i such that ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and Γ LLL A∨ Dab(∆). Where these conditions are ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . ., define Θ = ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 ∪ . . .. Take the j ≤ i for which Θ ⊂ Ω j , Θ ⊂ Ω j−1 . By Lemma 6, for every ϕ ∈ Φ j (Γ), there is a ϕ ∈ Φ i (Γ) such that ϕ ⊆ ϕ . By ( †) this implies that for every ϕ ∈ Φ j (Γ), there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω j such that ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and Γ LLL A∨ Dab(∆). Θ ⊂ Ω j−1 implies that there is a condition, say ∆ k , for which ∆ k ⊂ Ω j , ∆ k ⊂ Ω j−1 while Γ LLL A∨ Dab(∆ k ).
We can infer that there is a HAL m -proof from Γ in which (i) every minimal Dab j -consequence of Γ is derived on the condition ∅, (ii) for every ϕ ∈ Φ j (Γ), A is derived on a condition ∆ ⊂ Ω j for which ∆ ∩ ϕ = ∅ and (iii) on a line l of the proof, A is derived on the condition ∆ k . In view of Definition 11 and Definition 7, A is finally derived on line l of this proof.
Corollary 1 A is finally derived on a line l of a HAL x -proof from Γ, where ∆ ⊂ Ω is the condition of line l iff Γ AL x i A for an i ∈ I.
To understand the importance of the following theorem, it is important to keep in mind that we defined Cn HAL x (Γ) in Section 3 as a function of the different sets Cn AL x i (Γ) and the lower limit logic -hence independent of the proof theory spelled out in the current section.
Theorem 11 Γ HAL
Proof. First, note that the following two statements are equivalent by Definition 9 and the compactness of LLL: (⇐) Suppose A ∈ Cn HAL x (Γ). From (2), by Corollary 1: for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}: B j is finally derived on a line l j of a finite HAL x -proof p j from Γ, where ∆ ⊂ Ω is the condition of line l j . Where p p denotes the concatenation of p and p , there is a HAL x -proof from Γ: p 1 . . . p n . In this proof, B 1 , . . . , B n are finally derived.
14 By the rule RU*, we can add one line l to this proof at which A is derived from B 1 , . . . , B n on the condition * . Since by Definition 12, the marking of line l depends solely on the marking of lines l 1 , . . . , l n , every extension of the proof in which line l is marked can be further extended such that line l is unmarked again. By Definition 8, Γ HAL x A.
The Shortcut for Reliability
There is a more perspicuous proof theory for HAL r as well. As a first indication of how this works, consider again the Γ from Section 3.2: Γ = {♦p, ♦♦q, ♦♦r, ¬p∨ ¬r}. Recall that the minimal Dab-formula (♦p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (♦♦r ∧ ¬r) implied that ♦p ∧ ¬p ∈ U 2 (Γ), and therefore we needed the extra rule RU* and the new marking definition, to allow for the derivation of p ∧ q on an unmarked line. However, as ♦p ∧ ¬p ∈ U 1 (Γ),¬(♦p ∧ ¬p) is a K r 1 -consequence of Γ, and hence it is also a HK r -consequence of Γ.
Let me generalize this insight. Recall from the previous section that Ω i = Ω i − Ω i−1 , where Ω 1 = Ω 1 . Note that by restriction ( ‡ ) above, for every i ∈ I, Ω i is non-empty. Note also that in the example of Section 3.2,
That is, we can derivě ¬ B in a K r i -proof from Γ on the condition {B}, and {B} ∩ U i (Γ) = ∅. In other words, whether or not B ∈ U j (Γ) for a j > i, does not matter for the hierarchic logic. As long as B ∈ U i (Γ), it will be considered reliable. Still in other words, as long as B ∈ Ω i does not occur in a minimal Dab i -consequence, it remains a reliable abnormality. Note that by definition, B cannot occur in a minimal Dab k -consequence for any k < i.
For every ∆ ⊂ Ω, define ∆ = ∆∩Ω i , with i ∈ I such that ∆ ⊂ Ω i , ∆ ⊂ Ω i−1 . Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences of Γ, define the set of unreliable formulas for the logic HAL r :
By this definition, B ∈ U (Γ) iff B ∈ Ω i and B occurs in a minimal Dab iconsequence of Γ. Here we can observe again that the logic imposes a "hierarchy" on the whole set Ω. This hierarchy can be represented by the following sequence: Ω 1 , Ω 2 , . . .. If the logic is forced by the premises to choose between the abnormality A ∈ Ω i and the abnormality B ∈ Ω i+j , it will consider B as unreliable. For example, consider Γ = {♦p, ♦♦q, ¬p ∨ ¬q}. Note that either ♦p ∧ ¬p or ♦♦q∧¬q has to be true in view of these premises and the logic K. Informally, this means that either a very plausible belief (p) has to be given up, or a slightly less plausible belief (q). The hierarchic logic HK r then chooses for the least harmful of these two options: Γ HK r ♦♦q ∧ ¬q and also Γ HK r p.
However, this does not mean that if Γ LLL A∨ B, A ∈ Ω i and B ∈ Ω i+j , then A is necessarily reliable. For example, where the logic is HK r , and Γ = {♦p, ♦ 2 q, ♦ 3 r, ¬p ∨ ¬q, ¬q ∨ ¬r}, (♦ 2 q ∧ ¬q) ∨ (♦ 3 r ∧ ¬r) is a minimal Dabconsequence of Γ . Nevertheless, q is still considered unreliable, in view of the minimal Dab-consequence (♦p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (♦ 2 q ∧ ¬q). In other words, only p will be freed from suspicion by the hierarchic logic.
It is fairly easy to obtain a new proof theory for HAL r , relying on these considerations. The inference rules for this proof theory are exactly the same as for the flat logic AL r -see Section 2. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s, define the set of unreliable formulas at stage s as follows:
Definition 13 HAL
Again, final derivability is given by Definition 7 and an adjustment of Definition 8 -replace AL x by HAL r . This gives us the consequence relation Γ HAL r A. Note that this proof theory is significantly less complex than the more general one from Section 5.1. No extra inference rules or marking definitions are required; a small correction to the definition of the set of unreliable formulas suffices.
The reader may wonder why I called this proof theory a "shortcut" proof theory. The reason is fairly straightforward: there are Γ, A for which A can be proven in fewer steps in a HAL r -proof from Γ, than in a HAL r -proof from Γ. An example is the one from Section 5. If we consider the proof in that section as a HAL r -proof, the formula p ∧ q is finally derived on line 10. On the other hand, a HAL r -proof from Γ may be more instructive, in that it shows us which formulas follow by one of the logics AL r i . The general conclusion one should draw is that there are two distinct proof theories for HAL r , and that each one has its own merits. In the remainder of this section, it is proven that Γ HAL r A iff A ∈ Cn HAL r (Γ).
Lemma 10 For every i ∈
As a result, Θ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and j ≤ i. This implies that Dab(Θ) is a minimal Dab i -consequence of Γ. This implies that ∆ ∩ U i (Γ) = ∅, which contradicts (ii). 
Lemma 11 For every i ∈ I and every finite
∆ ⊂ Ω i : if ∆ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅, then Γ HAL r¬Dab(∆). Proof. Suppose (i) ∆∩U (Γ) = ∅ for a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω i . Suppose (ii) ∆∩U i (Γ) = ∅.
This implies that there is a minimal Dab
i -consequence of Γ, say Dab(Θ), such that ∆ ∩ Θ = ∅. Since ∆ ⊂ Ω i , Θ ⊂ Ω i−1 . By the definition of U (Γ), Θ ∩ Ω i ⊆ U (Γ). As a result, ∆ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅,
Theorem 12
Proof. (⇒) Suppose A ∈ Cn HAL r (Γ). By the compactness of LLL, there are B 1 , . . . , B n such that B 1 ∈ Cn AL r i 1 (Γ), . . . , B n ∈ Cn AL r in (Γ) and {B 1 , . . . , B n } LLL A. By Lemma 10: for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
By Lemma 11, Γ HAL r¬ Dab(∆ i ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By CL-properties, Γ HAL r A.
Lemma 12
There is a HAL r -proof from Γ that contains a line on which A is derived on the condition ∆ ⊂ Ω iff Γ LLL A∨ Dab(∆).
Proof. Immediate in view of Lemma 1 from [3] and the fact that the inference rules of a AL x -proof are identical to the inference rules of a HAL r -proof.
Lemma 13 A is finally derived at line l of a HAL r -proof from Γ, iff, where ∆ is the condition of line l, ∆ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅. (⇐) Suppose A is derived at line l of a HAL x -proof from Γ on the condition ∆, and ∆ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅. In that case, we can extend the proof and derive every minimal Dab-consequence of Γ at a stage s, whence U s (Γ) = U (Γ) = U s (Γ) for all s > s. In view of Definition 13, line l is unmarked at stage s and it is unmarked in every extension of the proof, whence Γ HAL r A.
Proof. Relying on Theorem 12, Lemma 12, Lemma 13, and Definition 8 consecutively, the following propositions are equivalent:
A is derived in a HAL r -proof from Γ on a condition ∆ and ∆ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅ (4) A is finally derived in a HAL r -proof from Γ (5) Γ HAL r A 6 The Semantics
The Intersection of the Sets of Flat Adaptive Models
As indicated by Definitions 1 and 2, flat adaptive logics have a selective semantics: a subset of the LLL-models of Γ is selected in view of a specific criterion. The same holds for hierarchic adaptive logics. In this case, the selection is based on the selections by each of the flat adaptive logics of the combination. The resulting set of models is complete with respect to the consequence relation of HAL x . Where the set of AL , the set of HAL x -models of Γ is defined as follows:
Note that the following facts hold:
Proof. Immediate in view of Definition 14 and Definition 2. The semantic consequence relation can now be defined in the usual way:
From Theorem 13 and Theorem 14, we immediately get:
Completeness for Reliability
For the Reliability Strategy, we can prove that Cn HAL r (Γ) is complete with respect to the set of all HAL r -models. The proof of this property relies on the following lemma:
In view of the above proof, we can immediately derive the following fact:
By the compactness of LLL, there is a finite number of finite sets Γ ⊆ Γ,
Abbreviate the classical conjunction of the members of a finite Θ ⊂ W + byˇ Θ. By Fact 3, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n},ˇ ∆ j ∈ Cn AL r j (Γ), hence alsoˇ ∆ j ∈ i∈I Cn AL r i (Γ). Since every AL r i is reflexive by Theorem 2, also Γ ∈ i∈I Cn AL r i (Γ). By (2) and Definition 9, A ∈ Cn HAL r (Γ). This contradicts ( ), hence (1) is false: Γ ∪ i∈I ∆ i LLL A. This implies by the completeness of LLL that there is a LLL-model that satisfies Γ ∪ i∈I ∆ i and¬ A. By Lemma 14, this model is an AL r i -model of Γ, for every i ∈ I, hence by Definition 14, it is a HAL r -model of Γ. As a result, Γ |= HAL r A.
An Alternative for Reliability
Recall the definition of U (Γ) from Section 5.3. In view of the shortcut proof theory, it is possible to define an alternative semantics for HAL r : the set of all HAL r -models of Γ is the set of all LLL-models M for which Ab(M ) ⊆ U (Γ). This is established by the following theorem: , then by Definition 1, M |= B for a B ∈ Ω i , B ∈ U i (Γ). Take the j ≤ i for which B ∈ Ω j . Since B ∈ U i (Γ), also B ∈ U j (Γ), and as a result, B does not occur in a minimal Dab j -consequence of Γ. Hence B ∈ U (Γ). As a result, Ab(M ) ⊆ U (Γ).
Restricted Completeness for Minimal Abnormality
Where Φ(Γ) is finite, a similar completeness result can be established for the Minimal Abnormality Strategy. As in Section 6.2, the proof relies on a lemma about the flat adaptive logics AL and M |= ∆). , then by Lemma 4 from [3] : for no ϕ j ∈ Φ i (Γ), Ab(M ) = ϕ j . This means that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}: M |= A j for an
Lemma 15 immediately gives us the following fact:
Note that where Φ(Γ) is finite, Φ i (Γ) is finite for every i ∈ I, in view of Lemma 7. As a result, we can apply Lemma 15 and Fact 4 to construct a similar proof as the one for Theorem 16 (we simply have to adjust the definition of the ∆ i s), and arrive at the following: Notwithstanding the importance of this result, especially for most concrete applications, it is possible to construct a premise set for which completeness fails. The original example is presented by Diderik Batens in his [5, Chapter 6] . I will present an adapted version of this example, based on a logic similar to the one from Section 3.2.
Proposition 1 There are Γ, A such that Γ |= HAL m A, whereas A ∈ Cn HAL m (Γ).
Proof. Consider the logic HK.2 m , defined as follows:
where K 
A brief look at Γ shows us that all minimal Dab 1 -consequences of Γ are given by Π 1 , and all minimal 
Let call this set of models M 2 . In every model M ∈ M 2 , r holds: Π 3 entails that if for a j, k ∈ N, ! 1 p j and ! 2 q k are false, then r must be true. Since no
As a result, Γ |= HK m r. However, r ∈ Cn HK.2 m (Γ). To see why, consider all K m 1 -consequences that are not K-consequences of Γ. These follow from two sets of formulae: {! 2 q i ∨! 2 q j | i, j ∈ N, i = j} and {r∨! 2 q j | j ∈ N}. The K m 2 -consequences that are not Kconsequences of Γ, are consequences of the formulae {r∨! 1 p i | i ∈ N}. Neither of these formulae, nor any conjunction of them, suffices to K-derive r.
As is clear from the example above, the Minimal Abnormality Strategy sometimes results in a selection of models that carries information beyond what can be expressed by a (possibly infinite) set of finite formulas. In the example, every K m 1 -model falsifies one abnormality ! 1 p i with i ∈ N. However, there is no finite formula, nor any set of such formulas, that can express this property of the minimally abnormal models. It is precisely this mechanism that leads to the incompleteness result above. However, as is shown in [5, Chapter 6] , combined logics by superposition fare no better in this respect, for the same reason.
Some Meta-theoretic Properties
This section contains some interesting meta-theoretic properties of HAL r and HAL m . I do not pretend that this is all there is to say about hierarchic adaptive logics; these are merely arguments in favor of further research of these systems and their application to concrete forms of non-monotonic reasoning.
Reflexivity of HAL x
Just as for AL x , the consequence relation HAL x is reflexive:
Since LLL is reflexive, and by Definition 9, Γ ⊆ Cn HAL x (Γ).
From Theorem 19, we can derive a fact that will be used in Section 7.4:
Reliability versus Minimal Abnormality
The following theorem is the hierarchic counterpart of Theorem 5:
We can prove that HAL m has the fixed point property, whenever Φ(Γ) is finite. The proof relies on the restricted soundness and completeness result for HAL m and on Fact 5 from Section 7.1. 
Equivalent Premise Sets and Maximality of the LLL
For any logic L, we say that Γ and
The following theorems were proven in [10] :
Theorem 23 If L is a Tarski-logic weaker than AL x , and Γ and Γ are Lequivalent, then Γ and Γ are AL x -equivalent.
Theorem 24 If L is a Tarski-logic weaker than AL x , and Γ and Γ are Lequivalent, then Γ ∪ ∆ and Γ ∪ ∆ are AL x -equivalent.
Theorem 25 For all monotonic logics L weaker than AL x and for all Γ, Cn L (Γ) ⊆ Cn LLL (Γ). (Maximality of the LLL) As explained in [10] , these theorems (and others) show the strength of the adaptive logic approach to non-monotonic reasoning, compared to other approaches. Since hierarchic adaptive logics were developed with the same general goal in mind, we should see whether the above listed properties hold for them as well. As shown below, this is the case. I will reverse the order of the theorems: I first prove the theorem about the maximality of the lower limit logic, and use this theorem to establish the two theorems about the equivalence of certain premise sets. To get there, we first need two definitions and two lemmas. To prepare for Theorem 26 below, we have to introduce a new set of minimal choice sets: Theorem 28 If L is a Tarski-logic weaker than HAL x , and Γ and Γ are Lequivalent, then Γ and Γ are HAL x -equivalent.
Proof. Suppose L is a Tarski-logic weaker than HAL x . By Theorem 27: L is a Tarski-logic weaker than or equipowerful to LLL. By Theorem 23, for every i ∈ I: Γ and Γ are AL For reasons of space, the example will not be presented here. The motor behind it, is that infinitely many conditions, belonging to infinitely many different Ω i 's are necessary to derive the formula A. As a result, no logic AL m i can yield A, whereas the flat adaptive logic that takes as its set of abnormalities Ω = Ω 1 ∪ Ω 2 ∪ . . . does yield A.
Note that this difficulty can only arise for hierarchic logics that are built up from an infinite number of flat adaptive logics -in the other cases, AL
x is the last flat logic that went into the combination. Hence if there are finitely many flat adaptive logics in the combination, the hierarchic adaptive logics are always at least as strong as their flat nephews.
For those who might still see Proposition 4 as a drawback of hierarchic adaptive logics, note that we can simply change Definition 9, adding Cn AL x (Γ) inside the brackets, to ensure that HAL
x is always at least as strong as AL x . This would of course result in a new logic, but it would not do any harm to the meta-theoretic results, and the proof theory and semantics of the resulting system can be easily derived from the one defined in this paper.
In Conclusion
As indicated in the introduction, combinations of adaptive logics are a necessary tool to accomplish the adaptive logics project: to explicate non-monotonic reasoning processes. However, they have hitherto lagged behind flat adaptive logics, when it comes to the investigation of their universal properties. Now that our picture of flat adaptive logics has been clarified in several studies [3, 7, 6, 10, 18] , it has become time to turn to the combined logics, with the aid of the metatheory of the flat logics themselves. This paper is but one step in the direction of this more general goal. It shows that such investigations are not only useful from the point of view of concrete applications, but also that they can lead to fruitful new insights into the properties of (combined and flat) adaptive logics. Lemma 15 provides an example of this double dynamics: it concerns a property of flat adaptive logics that was established in order to prove a theorem about hierarchic adaptive logics. During the many discussions within the Ghent group that guided the research on this paper, we also discovered new facts about other combinations of adaptive logics.
18
Further research should focus on both the hierarchic approach, and these other combinations -notoriously the combinations by superposition and the ordered fusions of adaptive logics, as described in [5, Chapter 6] . The ultimate aim of such work should be to investigate the meta-theory of these systems, but also to simplify their proof theory and semantics as much as possible.
